This paper seeks to document and describe events in the last decade in China's airline markets, and to clarify some misunderstandings in regard to the 2002 airline consolidations that brought sweeping changes to China's aviation markets. Some possible reasons for the 2002 consolidations are inferred through analysing the numbers and facts of the late 1990s and early 2000s. We conclude that the consolidations may be a natural response to the changes that accompanied airline deregulation in China.
Introduction
China's airline markets have attracted the attention of many major international carriers, but have largely failed to attract the attention of academics. Literature on China's airline markets remains relatively sparse, owing to the country's opacity in aviation policies and the limitations of data availability. The dramatic changes that took place in China's airline industry in the past 20 years, from a period of strict regulation and control to being relatively uncontrolled and loosely supervised, resulted in chaotic and unexpected outcomes. Those within the industry had two opposing attitudes towards these changes: some applauded them and called for further reforms, while others resisted and demanded a return to regulation. This is also the case for the 2002 airline consolidations, which were controversial with regard to how to form an airline group and which carriers to include in each group.
The complexity of China's airline markets, increased by the government's sometimes inconsistent policies, is difficult to comprehend for economists and researchers outside the industry. This paper seeks to document and describe events in the last decade in China's airline markets, and to clarify some misunderstandings in regard to the 2002 airline consolidations that brought sweeping changes to China's aviation markets. Some possible reasons for the 2002 consolidations are inferred through analysing the numbers and facts of the late 1990s and early 2000s. We conclude that the consolidations may be a natural response to the changes that accompanied airline deregulation in China.
Stage 2: Transition from Central Planning to Market Orientation with ongoing Reforms
The second stage began in the late 1970s, when China was gradually moving away from its traditional centrally planned system. In the context of the -open door‖ policy adopted by the Chinese government, the airline industry started to embrace international rules and practices.
CAAC was separated from the air force and in 1980 came under the direct supervision of the State Council. Within CAAC, the six regional civil aviation bureaus became -half corporatised‖ with the aim of making them financially independent. 3 To encourage operating efficiency and profitability, in 1987 the State Council ratified the -Report on Civil Aviation Reform Measures and Implementation‖, and separated CAAC's government, administrative and regulatory roles from the direct management of the day-to-day operations of commercial airlines and airports. Following the ratification of this report, between 1987 and 1991 six trunk airlines based in the regional capital cities emerged:
Air China (Beijing), China Eastern (Shanghai), China Northwest (Xi'an), China Northern (Shenyang), China Southwest (Chengdu) and China Southern (Guangzhou). CAAC was the nominal owner of these airlines, in the name of the state. Accompanying these reforms was growth in the number of regional airlines, which were usually established by local governments or jointly with CAAC in a bid to support the local economy. Most began with only two or three planes and were based in their provincial capitals, from where they provided services to gateway cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
Both the regional and trunk airlines were tightly regulated by CAAC in every aspect of air services provision, market entry, route entry, frequency and pricing, with only limited competition between the regional airlines and the trunk airlines on a small number of routes.
Until 1996, Chinese airlines competed against each other through standards of service and their safety record, rather than through competitive pricing. In fact, passengers had no strong brand identity awareness before the mid-1990s, as many airlines had only recently been established and were effectively indistinguishable because of the tight regulation by CAAC.
In such a controlled environment, it was highly unlikely that competitiveness would be fostered.
Stage 3: Deregulation, Privatisation and Consolidation
The year 1997 marked the start of the third stage of the development of China's airline industry. This stage, which continues to the present, provides a landmark of deregulation, privatisation and consolidation. From 1997 on, airlines experienced a period of unexpected shocks from both home and abroad, with increasing challenges from aggressive international airlines, further deregulation demands from foreign governments, and a worldwide trend towards airline alliances. Passengers with a high level of awareness of their consumer rights demanded better services and prices. Profits were no longer guaranteed and fluctuations in revenue were unavoidable. Government policies on the airline industry in this era were at times inconsistent and promoted controversy, as can be seen in the following sections.
Deregulation in Airfares
The first sign of price relaxation occurred in 1992, when the State Council allowed the price of airfares to vary within a range of 10% of the set price. However, in practice, all airlines still adopted the same price, and changed their prices simultaneously under the supervision of CAAC. From 1 July 1997, price discrimination on foreign passengers was eliminated and the same price applied to all passengers who purchased their tickets in China. In November 1997, CAAC promulgated the policy of -one class with multiple discounts‖, 4 encouraging airlines to adopt a price discrimination strategy in an attempt to attract more passengers in order to make full use of their capacity. This policy marked the beginning of the deregulation of air prices. Repeated price wars between airlines followed. To make their load factors look good and to snatch greater market shares, airlines sold their seats at low prices without considering their costs. The destructive dogfight led to a heavy loss of 3.5 billion Chinese yuan (US$0.44 billion) for the whole industry in 1998 (International Finance Daily,
17/04/2003).
On 8 May 1998, CAAC issued -The Decision to Enforce Supervision and Restore Order in the Air Market‖, prohibiting discounts from falling below 20% of the normal price. As there were no penalties, many airlines disregarded this command and the price wars continued.
CAAC's role as a regulator and coordinator, which involved the issuing of policies and pricing, was being severely challenged. Thus, in February 1999 it introduced a stronger policy that had the intent of immediately halting any discounts on any route. It included the harsh penalty of expulsion from routes where violators discounted airfares. Several violations were detected on some routes and the violators were punished, 5 but when too many airlines continued discounting, CAAC could do nothing because it was too difficult to penalise them all. At the same time, consumers strongly opposed any tightening of control over prices, and the airlines did not want to be deprived of their pricing freedoms once they had been acquired (Li 2001 ).
-Revenue pooling‖ was CAAC's last-ditch attempt to curb destructive competition. per kilometre, taking airlines' average cost, market demand and the resources of consumers into account. For the first time airlines were given the right to decide the price at a range 25%
higher (price ceiling) and 45% lower than the benchmark price (price floor). Again, the range limit was ignored as 70% discounts on many routes were common both before and after the release of this scheme.
In fact, since the collapse of the revenue-pooling policy, CAAC has accepted a hands-off approach to price regulation and has turned a blind eye to the price wars. All it can do now is remind airlines of the scheme after any price war. The airlines do not strictly abide by regulations that have no clear and effective punishment measures. Thus, it can be seen that the pricing of air fares in China's domestic market has, de facto, been deregulated, without a
formal Deregulation Act such as in the US.
Recall the US airline deregulation experience that was detailed by Pickrell (1991) , from which we can make an interesting comparison with China's deregulation. Before the formal deregulation marked by the enactment of the 1978 Deregulation Act, the Civil Aeronautic Board (CAB), the regulatory body, like CAAC, was under mounting pressure from academics and the public, who called for relaxation of its controls over fares and airline entry. Restrictions imposed on charter flights were the first to be lifted, enabling them to provide low-fare services from 1975. In response to the threat from charter flights, the regulated airlines successfully applied for permission to discount coach fares up to 45%.
Later, a deeper discount (70%) was allowed by CAB. In 1978, before the formal deregulation, virtually all domestic routes experienced discount fares offered by the regulated airlines.
According to Pickrell, due to developments in the policies of fare flexibility, and more liberal entry and exit that had developed over the previous year, the Airline Deregulation Act simply codified them. The Act allowed deregulation measures to be phased in, and as a result airlines had full freedom to enter any market in 1981, and the full freedom to set fares in 1982. It seems that after years of unplanned deregulation before the passage of the Act, US deregulation moved on in a very planned and organised way as a result of the Deregulation Act. In contrast, China's deregulation of airfares under the 2004 Airfare Reform Scheme did not seem to have any intention to codify the de facto airfare flexibility, nor to offer a guideline for the future development of the airline industry. This shows that CAAC was not determined to grant full pricing freedom at this stage.
Deregulation of Entry and Exit
The Entry and exit to them still needs prior approval.
Privatisation
Because of communist ideology and its traditional conservatism, the airline industry shunned privatisation before the mid-1990s. Lo (2003) But once the tap was turned on, it was impossible to stop. As a capital-intensive industry, China's airlines have found that the stock market is more cost-effective than bank loans in raising money to buy planes. Loans were previously their only avenue for raising funds, but these were too expensive to allow the purchase of new planes. in airlines, as they are still operating as monopolies and such ownership might be likely to result in unfair competition. It also clearly lists the airlines and airports that CAAC will continue to own or hold (a majority stake) and that will therefore be controlled by the state.
The big three airlines and provincial capital airports as well as nine coastal airports are on the list.
The relaxation of the regulation on investment in civil aviation has encouraged the establishment of private airlines. More than 10 private airlines have been licensed since 2005. Most of them positioned themselves as low cost airlines. However, they have not posed any serious threat to the existing airlines so far because of their relatively small capacity.
Reforms and Deregulation are Still Progressing
On 3 March 2002, the State Council ratified the -Civil Aviation System Reform Programme‖, which has the following main goals:
 Restructure of the civil aviation administration system from four tiers to two tiers, i.e., CAAC and seven regional civil aviation bureaus (North China, Northeast China, East China, Central and South China, Southwest China, Northwest China and Xinjiang Urumqi). Provincial civil aviation bureaus were eliminated and replaced by 26 provincial civil aviation safety supervision offices. The role of CAAC and the regional bureaus was clearly defined with a focus on safety management, aviation market management, macro-control, 15 air traffic control management, and foreign relationships, with no interference in transport enterprises' internal affairs. issued -CAAC Guidelines on Deepening the Civil Aviation Reform‖, in which some objectives and tasks in the next five years were proposed. Two objectives were noticeable.
One is the removal of the control over operation rights on all domestic routes, which means that the registry-for-record system for entry and exit will apply for all the domestic routes by 2010. Domestic airlines will not be required to go through the approval procedure and will only need to report the decision to fly on a certain route to CAAC. Another objective is to remove the price floor set up in the 2004 Airfare Reform Scheme, although this floor has had little effect on airlines' pricing in reality.
The guidelines also state that the government encourages China's airline to engage in all forms of cooperation with foreign airlines including joining the international airline alliance.
In fact, the codesharing restriction between China and the US has already been removed First, major global economic powers and financial centres such as the US, Britain, Germany, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore all possess advanced and powerful commercial airline systems to facilitate their economic growth. Given China's rapid growth in GDP, the movement of goods and people needs an efficient air transport system. In turn, economic growth will be accelerated by efficient transport. Deregulation, privatisation and consolidation all came with a common purpose, namely to push the less efficient Chinese airlines to modernise in order to serve the growth economy.
The same reason applies to the local governments that wish to have closer links to the rest of China and the world. They need money from various sources, including the government, and foreign and domestic private investors to upgrade their local airports. A clear-cut law relating to investment in these areas is essential.
Second, in response to the increasing requests from the relatively efficient airlines that want more freedom to access domestic and international routes, simplifying entry and exit procedure is inevitable.
Third, an increase in the power of consumers pushed CAAC to remove the minimum threshold imposed on airfares. As well, public pressure ensured that CAAC took no consistent and effective punishment measures against the carriers that violated the threshold.
The benchmark prices that CAAC proposed were questioned by the press with a complaint that the purpose of such prices was to secure profits and that they gave carriers no incentive to lower costs. People were dissatisfied when they found that domestic airfares in countries such as the US were much cheaper over similar distances, even though American airlines have higher labour costs.
Fourth, the emergence of substitute products for scheduled airline services, such as high-speed trains between metropolitan cities, gave a greater choice to passengers. Price then became an important factor in attracting passengers.
Finally, the high level of subsidies resulted in inefficiencies in the airline industry and further forced governments at all levels to inject more money into the industry. Privatisation is likely to ease the government's burden and foster a competitive airline industry without any expense to the taxpayer.
Following the removal of excessive and inappropriate controls by CAAC, an examination of the performance of China's airlines would be an interesting research topic. On the one hand a more deregulated environment means potentially stronger competition, but on the other hand increased concentration resulting from the 2002 consolidation might pose a threat to competition, especially in the absence of an effective antitrust law. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following sections, we seek to refute the argument that China's 2002 airline consolidation is an arranged marriage, with CAAC being the controlling partner that has overruled the wishes of the merging parties. Later sections of this paper will show that this argument is not completely true. A careful study of China's civil aviation evolution and the consolidation process demonstrates that consolidation is a natural solution to the problems facing China's airlines, and is not merely a result of government policy.
Airline Consolidations

Eliminating the Regional Airlines
China's first airline merger occurred in 1994 when Fujian Airlines, which had been in operation for just one year and operated only a few small Chinese-manufactured Yun-7 aircraft, was taken over by Xiamen Airlines. Because these two airlines were both based in In fact, the regional airlines generally did not play on a level field with the trunk airlines.
Their lifelines were the routes that link Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which overlap with those of the big three-Air China, China Eastern and China Southern. Their heavy losses that resulted from the cutthroat competition in the price wars could not be constantly funded by their shareholders, mainly the respective local governments. However, the trunk airlines could still operate with the support of the central government that would not let them go bankrupt. In addition, their lack of experience and trained staff forced the regional carriers to consolidate with the trunk airlines. But what will be the fates of the unprofitable trunk airlines such as China Northern and China Northwest? Will the central government continue to pour money into them with no promise of a return? The answer might be to treat them the same as the inefficient regional carriers: eliminate them through mergers.
Consolidating into the Big Three
After the signing of an agreement, the merging of groups of China's airlines was declared on 11 October 2002. The merger resulted in three major airline groups, with a few remaining independent airlines (see Table 1 ). Air China Group was a consolidation of Air China It was CAAC that exercised its authority by deciding that Air China, China Eastern and China Southern should remain after the mergers. This is not surprising as these three were in many respects the top performers among the trunk airlines: financial status, reputation, management skill and, possibly most importantly, each was headquartered at one of China's most important cities-Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively. However, CAAC could not arrange everything because its authority was weakened when it lost control over airfares. For example, which airline was to join which group was largely left to the airlines through discussions and bargaining. The negotiations, as reported by Xiao (2001) , usually followed the pattern of CAAC making suggestions first, and then the particular individual carriers discussing and assessing the feasibility of the suggestions. Any disagreements were aired until a compromise solution, still subject to the approval of the State Council, was 18 The corresponding author heard this rumour when he was working at Shanghai Airport in 2000.
formulated. Therefore, China's airline consolidations were more than an arranged marriage.
In fact, although it cannot be denied that CAAC played an important role in the process of consolidation, CAAC has repeatedly claimed that the mergers between the airlines followed the wills of the individual companies, with only guidance coming from the government (Wang and Cheng 2001) .
Even after CAAC had decided that the major three airlines would remain as the cornerstones of the aviation industry, lengthy negotiations took place among the airlines to decide which carriers should be included in each group. It can be imagined that there were many stories old MD aircraft, were grouped together through the negotiation. This arrangement ensured that neither group had an absolute advantage over the other following the mergers, which seems to be an acceptable outcome for all parties. As mentioned earlier, CNAC only had a small subsidiary, Zhejiang Airlines, providing services in the domestic market, which is small in scale. Therefore, compared with the other two groups, the Air China group had a relatively small presence in domestic markets. However, considering that Air China, the flag carrier with the most extensive international networks, has the highest reputation in many respects, the overall competitiveness of the Air China Group can provide a competitively effective constraint on the other two groups.
The three newly established groups are not only balanced in size and capacity, but are also spatially balanced with respect to geographical space. The home cities of group members in all three groups form an interesting triangle in the map of China. For example, in the Air China Group, the home bases of the three members lie in the north (Beijing), east (Hangzhou) and southwest (Chengdu), respectively; in the China Eastern Group, Shanghai, Xi'an and Kunming are located in China's east, northwest and southwest, respectively; the China Southern Group includes a base in the northeast (Shenyang), northwest (Urumqi) and south (Guangzhou), respectively. Each group possesses a gateway city and inland hubs, giving them enough space to expand, and equal opportunity to redesign their operational networks to build up competitiveness. The spatial balance implies that a direct consequence of the mergers would be greatly enhanced multimarket contacts among each group. The big three airlines would compete in a much broader market than ever before.
The declaration of the mergers on 11 October 2002 was only the beginning of a long and tortuous integration process. It is difficult to pinpoint when the full integration of each airline group in terms of their schedules, service, assets and manpower coordination was achieved.
It likely did not take long for the airlines in a group to jointly set fares and schedules and jointly share airport facilities and maintenance services. 
Forces Driving the Consolidations
A General Overview of the reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions
There are three types of mergers: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate (Asch 1983) . When one company merges all or part of the stock or assets of another company that directly competes against the acquirer in the same product line or in the same geographic area, the merger is horizontal; a vertical merger occurs when the participating companies are in a supplier-customer relationship; a merger that does not fall into these two categories and that is usually associated with market extension or product extension activities is conglomerate.
The China airline mergers are mainly horizontal mergers, but they are also associated with extended networks after the mergers, which have some elements of conglomerate mergers.
Each merger case has its own motives. A complex pattern of motives might exist for a single merger case. However, there are some general motives that most mergers and acquisitions have, and after a discussion of these we will move on to the facts and numbers to infer the motives of China's airline consolidations.
The managerial literature has voluminous discussions of the motives for mergers and acquisitions. Trautwein (1990) surveys the theories of merger motives. Seven groups of motives are established: efficiency or synergy theory, monopoly theory, valuation theory, empire-building theory, process theory, raider theory, and disturbance theory.
Similar types of motives were summarised by Bekovitch and Narayanan (1993): the synergy motive, the agency motive, and hubris. Other motives, such as diversification and tax considerations, are also possible. However, Mukherjee et al. (2004) , by conducting direct investigations among the decision makers, find that the usual primary motivation for mergers and acquisitions is to achieve operating synergies. Andrade et al. (2001) provide a possible motive that is highly relevant to our case. They contend that deregulation and the resulting industry shock that it caused became a dominant factor in merger activity in the US in the 1990s.
Apart from the above motives, researchers into airline consolidations, notably the airline alliances, have identified a series of particular benefits that may become the dominant motives for merging airlines: greater ability to overcome regulating restrictions; cost reductions and economies of scale, scope and density; coordinated schedules and prices to optimise the demand for each flight with improved service quality; and opportunities to reshape industry structure and to raise barriers against new entrants (Oum and Park 1997; Oum et al. 2000; Goh and Uncles 2003) .
In a previous section, we described the -chaos‖ in airline markets (so-called by many airline people) in terms of the repeated irrational pricing behaviour. 20 Being unable to re-regulate pricing, CAAC resorted to guiding the airlines into consolidation. The desire of the government constituted one of the many forces that drove the mergers. However, it was not only the wish of CAAC to end the -unnecessary‖ competition. Airlines also sought the consolidations because, as will be seen shortly through figures and facts, outside pressure together with financial difficulties had forced them to consider mergers. Seeking synergies or market power might have also been a motive, but it should be understood that the motives 20 A referee pointed out that the pricing behaviour of airlines may seem irrational, but it may well be consistent with the nature of the markets in which they operate. It could be that the institutional structure of the markets is irrational, rather than the behaviour of the airlines.
inferred by outsiders, or even the real motives of the participants, may not be necessarily realised and become the anticipated results.
A World Trend-Airline Mergers and Airline Alliances
In the US from 1966 to 1980, horizontal mergers were not usually permitted if the resulting firm would control more than 15% of the market (Shepherd and Shepherd 2004) . The
Reagan administration then loosened this antitrust policy as long as the merger would lead to improved efficiency, unleashing a spate of mergers in the 1980s. In fact, economic history
shows that mergers and acquisitions occur in waves (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996) . China's airline mergers took place in the setting of this new wave of international consolidation. In addition, the international competitive advantages of the US carriers had been strengthened by the mergers. Clougherty (2000) argues that domestic airline mergers increase international efficiency via the enhancement of domestic networks and via the elimination of domestic competition. Therefore, international competitive incentives can be an additional spur to domestic airline mergers. To gain a similar international competitive advantage was one of the main driving forces behind the Chinese government's airline consolidation policy. The merging parties believed that they were participating in a worldwide trend and hoped that consolidation would rapidly increase their efficiency, improving their ability to counter their foreign rivals.
The Formation of Hub-and-Spoke Networks to achieve Cost Savings
Although China's total air traffic ranked at number four in the world measured in China faces the problem of how to develop a hub-and-spoke system in place of the -linear‖ point-to-point structure, thereby creating a wave of arrivals followed by a wave of departures at a hub for the connecting passengers, which were well developed in the US following airline deregulation. More than 20 years after China opened its door to the outside world, many overseas Chinese and foreigners still found it inconvenient to fly on to inland cities from Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou because of the lack of suitable connecting flights. Also, according to the then airline timetables, passengers travelling between the two medium-sized cities of Zhengzhou and Qingdao, which in 2002 were connected by only five flights a week, had to travel by train or bus between the two cities if they missed their flight and did not want to wait for the next flight on another day. However, now, by carefully designing their flight schedules, this inconvenience can be avoided. Schedules permit international and domestic passengers to seamlessly travel to their final destinations via the hubs without the need to change to another carrier or a lengthy wait in the transfer lounge.
Airline schedules also allow passengers to travel between Zhengzhou and Qingdao via a transfer at one of the hub cities, say, Beijing or Shanghai, where there are many flights each day to these two medium-sized cities.
In fact, building a hub-and-spoke network is not only a supplier-driven strategy to maximise capacity to accommodate more passengers so as to achieve economies of scope and density.
It is also driven by the needs of consumers. In general, an airline becomes more attractive to frequent flyers if it serves a large number of destinations. Consolidation has made this possible. Each of the three groups forms a big triangle, which gives them the opportunity to change the ways that they provide services.
The Search for Improved Financial Performance
Nearly all the major US airlines experienced substantial change from a position of high profit to heavy losses in their financial performance in the three years following the passage of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (Williams 1994) . This led to the development of a series of activities in a bid to increase competitiveness, including the development of computer reservation systems, frequent flyer programmes, code-sharing alliances, and even
mergers. An amazingly similar story was repeated in China following the relaxation of airfares in 1997, including consolidation, which was a strategy that the Chinese airlines were compelled to take when facing financial difficulties.
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We first provide some informative data that gives an overview of China's air transport development since China opened its door. Table 2 Table 3 shows that the total revenue of the whole industry greatly increased during the past two decades. Narrowing the focus to the most recent decade shows that 1997 is a turning point. With the relaxed control over airfares in 1997, total revenue from all civil aviation immediately dropped by 10% in 1997 from 48 billion Chinese yuan (US$6 billion) in 1997 to 43 billion (US$5.4 billion) in 1998, though Table 2 suggests that total traffic turnover increased by 12.6% (in tonne-km) in this period. The revenue from international markets slid (by 15%) more than that from the domestic market (by 6.2%), indicating mounting pressure from international rivals. The decrease in revenue led to the call for price re-regulation in 1999, as mentioned earlier. As a result of ensuing intervention, civil aviation revenues from the domestic market saw a moderate increase, by 6.6% in 1999 and 9.3% in
2000.
A bigger increase in 2001 and 2002 from the domestic market might suggest the success of the -revenue pooling‖ scheme. However, it should be understood that this only indicates 21 However, without rigorous analysis of relevant data, it should not be concluded that deregulation directly contributed to the financial losses. In the US, the relationship between deregulation and airline profitability has been studied, with no firm conclusions being reached. Brenner et al. (1985) find that immediately after deregulation, airline profits reached their lowest level. However, Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1983) and Van Scyoc (1989) find that the fall in airline profits had nothing to do with deregulation.
success for the whole industry, not for every individual airline. Also, it only suggests a win in the short run, not necessarily being in the best interests of the industry in the long run, as all of China was undergoing the transformation towards a market economy, in which every industry had to be prepared to embrace a new free market sooner or later. This scheme was eventually abandoned when CAAC realised that this was not the right way to keep this industry profitable. However, after abandoning the scheme and with no other effective remedies that could satisfy all the relevant parties, consolidation seemed to be a natural choice. Consolidation may bring about some harmful effects, but they are not so immediate and in many cases not so controversial.
China's airline industry had a notorious safety record in the 1990s. 22 Yet, for the state-owned airlines, safety rather than profit had been the main concern. The US experience has demonstrated that neither deregulation nor the increased financial hazards has had an effect on the safety of airline travel (Rose 1989; Foreman 1993; Adrangi et al. 1997 ). In
China, there has been a decline in air traffic accidents since deregulation. However, many people in China's airline industry still have the same perception as described in Adrangi et al. (1997) for the US case, namely that the eroded profits following deregulation will force airlines to scrimp on aircraft maintenance and air crew training. There was also concern about overuse of the airlines' resources (e.g., overtime for aircrew) by increasing the frequency of flights and operating new routes with no oversight when route entry and exit has been liberalised. For these reasons, China's aviation authority was wary of every step of reform, and tended to be conservative and indecisive at times. For many years the question, -which should be put first, safety or profit‖ was undebatable for many government officials, who undoubtedly put safety first. Therefore, it is not surprising that airlines were not being pushed too much for profits and as a result subsidies had to be paid to the state-owned airlines whenever they made losses. However, with the ongoing privatisation of many once wholly state-owned airlines and decreased subsidies from the government, pursuit of profits to maximise the market value of the company has become the ultimate goal. However, at the same time, safety should not be compromised. In these circumstances, consolidation seems to be a promising means through which the carriers can achieve both goals.
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Another performance indicator is the load factor, which measures the percentage of available seating capacity that is filled with passengers. Looking at Tables 4 to 6, both the passenger load factor and the weight load factor of the whole industry decreased greatly after 1997. The individual airline data demonstrate the same result for all the trunk airlines and most of the regional airlines. Tables 4-6 give rise to the question, why did the load factors not improve after the airlines were allowed to sell discount tickets? seats that were generally considered much safer. This may be the principal reason for the decrease in load factors since 1997, leading to strong competition to fill up the aircraft and eventually to the heavy losses in their financial reports.
The Chinese government has the final say in purchasing aircraft from Boeing, Airbus and other manufacturers, and for political reasons, aircraft purchases must be balanced between the two major manufacturers. Because of this, many of China's airlines have a very diverse fleet, which increases their training and maintenance costs. A merger can enable members of one group to better deploy their aircraft because of a more extensive network. Some surplus or unsuitable planes for one member of the group may be better utilised by another member on another route. Thus, both members operate more efficiently and higher load factors may be achieved. Aircraft utilisation is also likely to be increased.
It should be noted that most of the empirical studies have shown that horizontal mergers on average are not associated with higher profitability (see the survey by Jacquemin and Slade 1989), but this presumption still remains in favour of many mergers, especially for firms that are faced with financial difficulties. Empirical evidence suggests that poorly run firms are seen as takeover targets as they wish to avoid bankruptcy (De Bondt and Thompson 1992; 23 The poor management of some acquired airlines may be a potential threat to safety. However, the application of a better-performing carrier's standards after the mergers may help improve their safety records. Matsusaka 1993) . Shrieves and Stevens (1979) argue that some failing firms find the cost of merging less than the cost of bankruptcy. Porter (1990) regarded alliances as a transitional device and as a response to uncertainty about the future, especially for firms experiencing structural change or facing unprecedented competition. Doganis (2006) also holds this view and contends that more large international airline alliances or mergers will be created in the coming years as a result. For example, a cross-country airline alliance (joint venture) occurred in 1993 when KLM acquired Northwest Airlines, which was in financial trouble (Tully 1996) . The proposed strategic alliance between Qantas and Air New Zealand, and the acquisition of a substantial equity investment by Qantas in Air New Zealand also came at a time of poor performance by Air New Zealand. 24 All these facts indicate that it was an appropriate time for the poorly performing Chinese airlines to consolidate.
Outside Shocks
Outside shocks might have prompted the airline mergers. There is no doubt that the onset of the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see Chin et al. 1999 for discussion) and the September 11 tragedy in the US had a profound influence on the airline industry (see Ito and Lee 2005 for an assessment). As a result of the sharp decrease in demand in the international market after these events, the airlines had to curtail their international flights and transfer capacity to the domestic market. This consequently intensified domestic competition, which called for restructuring in the airline industry.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the evolution of China's airline industry with an emphasis on the deregulation stage after which the airline consolidations occurred, and the reasons why they happened. In spite of a chequered process in deregulation, further deregulation has since been pushed forward in China's airline industry with further privatisation, easier entry and exit, and easier investment into aviation businesses.
With a brief review of the theories and empirical findings relating to the motives for mergers inconclusive owing to the simultaneous existence of multiple motives, as noted by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) , it seems that a worldwide consolidating trend, outside pressure posed by competitive foreign airlines, the pursuit of cost savings through a large network, and the financial difficulties facing the carriers, might be the primary drivers that led to the 2002 consolidations of China's airlines.
Worldwide, airlines have been constantly adjusting to the ever-changing and deregulated environment. Fundamental changes have also taken place in China since 1997 when deregulation started. The evolution of China's airline industry in the post-deregulation period appears to have much in common with the US, where lower airfares immediately followed deregulation, a spate of mergers occurred in the years after deregulation, and hub-and-spoke networks quickly developed to achieve the greater efficiency required to meet the stronger competition brought about by deregulation.
Also similar is that almost all the airline mergers in the US in the 1980s were allowed to go ahead without serious opposition from the US antitrust authorities. China's airline consolidation also occurred without any antitrust challenge owing to the lack of effective antitrust laws. However, one difference is that there has been much literature examining almost every aspect of the evolution of the US airline industry after deregulation, including the actual effects of the 1980s mergers, while only a few serious academic studies have been carried out on the evolution of China's airline industry, not to mention the assessment of their possible anticompetitive effects. This should be a future research area. 
